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Abstract
The number and sophistication of commercial remote sensing satellites has grown steadily since 2000 when the first highresolution satellite went into service. The nature and trajectory of the growth in satellite technology is outlined in this paper.
The discussion is placed in the context of an international relations theory about statehood. An area of limited statehood
framework is outlined, especially as it relates to the maladroit use of force by limited states unable or unwilling to discipline
security personnel or otherwise control the use of force. Of course, another possibility is that the use of excessive and
indiscriminant violence is deliberate. We consider the “regulation of violence” to be deliberate violence by nonstate actors
serving as “functional equivalents” for state oversight functions not found in limited statehood. NGOs and other international
institutions, comprising what Keck and Sikkink call a Transnational Activist Network (TAN), use remote sensing satellites to
gather data about uses of force by weak-state security apparatuses. Put more formally, we investigate the use of commercial,
high-resolution remote sensing data by TANs as they attempt to regulate excessive and indiscriminate violence used by the
security apparatuses of states that can be thought of as limited in key dimensions.
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Introduction
It is difficult for some to recall a world without digital maps,
satellite images, and nearly ubiquitous navigation devices.
Yet when high-resolution remote sensing satellites were
available to only the world’s most powerful and technically
sophisticated states, access to precision satellite images was
tightly controlled, and those who violated the restrictions
were subject to severe penalties. In 1985, for instance,
Samuel Loring Morison, an American naval intelligence
analyst, was convicted on two counts of espionage and two
counts of theft of government property for leaking satellite
images of a Soviet shipyard to Jane’s Defense Weekly, a
respected defense analysis publication.1 Figure 1 shows
one of the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite images leaked by
Morison.
Figure 2 is the same shipyard as it appeared in an image
taken by a European commercial satellite and used by
Google in 2014. One is now free to inspect what was
Soviet Shipyard 444 (Nikolayev South Shipyard, Mykolaiv,
Ukraine) using Google Earth.2 These two images illustrate
the extraordinary changes in remote sensing that have
occurred since 2000, the year the first high-resolution,
commercially owned and operated satellite images became
available. Images that were once shrouded in state secrecy
are now available to anyone possessing a computer and
internet connection, sometimes even at no cost. This
paper considers the implications of this development for
governance in areas of limited statehood.
I begin with an overview of two key concepts: areas of
limited statehood and digitally enabled collective action.
The paper then reviews remote sensing and geographical
information systems (GIS) technology. Given the technical
complexity of the topic and limited space, the goals of this
paper must remain modest. The aim is to offer an overview
of major developments and outline some of the technical
capabilities of various satellites. Two key points emerge in
this second section of the paper.
1
2

Stephen Engelberg, Spy Photos’ Sale Leads to Arrest,” The New York Times,
October 3, 1984. http://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/03/world/spy-photossale-leads-to-arrest.html.
A higher resolution image is available with Google Earth, but for the purposes
of comparison this less precise image was used. It was found in less than five
minutes of scanning the waterfront of the Port of Mykolaiv. Using the toggles
on Google Earth, one can move over a continuous image of the entire planet.

First, remote sensing is no longer monopolized by
powerful states, though many of the most powerful and
capable satellites are owned and operated by corporations
with close ties to the defense industries of major military
and technological powers. Despite these ties, a robust
international commercial sector offers remote sensing
products to nonstate actors and to other states that lack
the resources needed to launch and operate surveillance
satellites.
Secondly, remote sensing data are multifaceted. Commercial
satellites offer information that goes well beyond pictures
from space. Data about precise spatial relations and
coordinates are available, as are multispectral and hyperspectral data that register the material composition of
objects on the ground.
A third section of the paper offers a brief discussion of the
political implications of these technological developments
for a particular expression of limited statehood: the
unaccountable and excessive use of force by weak state
security forces. I am interested in the use of commercial
remote sensing in the “regulation of violence” by nonstate
actors in the context of the Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn
Sikkink model of transnational advocacy.3 As they note,
“The ability to generate and use information strategically
is the main asset of transnational advocacy networks.”4
Commercial remote sensing satellite technology has
affected that ability, perhaps profoundly.

3
4

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1998).
Margaret E.Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press, Kindle edition
2014), (Kindle Locations 3625-3627).
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Figure 1
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Loring_Morison

Figure 2
Source: Google Earth Engine with “Mykolaiv” as the search term

Page 6

JANUARY 2015

Digitally Enabled Collective Action in Areas of Limited
Statehood
In its broadest terms this paper explores digitally enabled
collective action in areas of limited statehood.5 An area of
limited statehood is a place, policy arena, or period of time
when the governance capacity of the state is unrealized or
faltering.6 Governance can be defined as initiatives intended
to provide public goods and to create and enforce binding
rules. International affairs literature also refers to steering
and social coordination when speaking of governance. I
treat governance as an analog to collective action, a term
more common to political economics.
Public goods include individual and collective security,
economic welfare, education, public health, infrastructure,
and a clean and safe environment. Binding rules may come
in the form of codified law that is enforced by formal state
institutions (security forces and judiciary), or they may be
norms and customs that are enforced by social pressure and
informal organizations, such as community policing and
traditional forms of arbitration and justice.7
A state’s governance capacity may fall short in several ways.
Where a state’s governance incapacity is coterminous with
its sovereign borders, it can be said to be a failed state. In
2014, Central African Republic offered one example of total
state failure. Other examples would include states that have
limited governance capacity in locations that are distant
from central administrative resources, as in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. North and South Kivu in the DRC are
too inaccessible for the state administrative apparatus in
Kinshasa to have a meaningful impact. Limited statehood
is also evident in urban slums such as Makoko in Lagos,
5
6
7

Steven Livingston and Gregor Walter-Drop, Bits and Atoms: Information and
Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014)
Thomas Risse (ed.), Governance Without a State?: Politics and Policies in Areas
of Limited Statehood, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). p. 9.
Regarding enforcement of binding rules in limited state environments, see
Steven Livingston, Africa’s Information Revolution: Implications for Crime,
Policing, and Citizen Security, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, (NDU
Press, 2013). For an example of criminal adjudication in limited state
environments, see Max Rettig, “Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation
in Post-conflict Rwanda?,” African Studies Review, Volume 51, Number
3, December 2008, pp. 25-50; Leo Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution,
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006).

Nigeria or Mathare in Nairobi, Kenya. These are places
devoid of state provisioning of roads, sanitation, security,
and most other public goods, despite their proximity to
central administrative resources. Yet in both cases, the
state cannot—or will not—provide public goods or enforce
binding rules with legitimate force.
Limited statehood may also apply to a particular policy
arena. In this case, the state fails to provide a particular
public good, such as adequate healthcare or effective
and accountable security. This condition may apply to
a particular location, such as an urban slum or distant
region, or it may be coterminous with state borders.
Limited statehood may also be sociologically based, as is
the case when an otherwise consolidated state fails (again,
sometimes by design) to provide public goods to persons
according to their race, gender, or religion, to name a few
of the common bases for discrimination. Apartheid South
Africa offers an example of such a state. The governance
capacity of a consolidated state such as this is oriented
toward the control of a disaffected and disenfranchised
segment of the population. Security comes to be defined as
securing one part of the population from demands made by
another marginalized segment of the population. Finally,
state governance capacity may be disrupted, such as when
a natural disaster degrades the governance capacity of a
state in the affected region. The scope of the diminished
governance capacity of the state and its duration is
contingent on its capacity prior to the catastrophe.
In general, rather than a dichotomous variable, as
references to failed (or not) states imply, state governance
capacity is more accurately conceptualized as running
along a continuum: from failed states at one end to fully
consolidated states at the other. It is also multifaceted,
evident in geographical pockets of territory or contingently
absent according to sociological considerations or
temporary exigencies. This makes meaningful metrics of
state governance capacity highly problematic. What might
appear to be a fully consolidated state according to gross
indicators might in fact be a quite limited state according
to sectorial, social, or even spatial grounds. Indeed, it is
Page 7
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intuitively clear that limited statehood of one sort or another
is quite common. This is true even of the Global North,
where large urban slums constitute, at least to a degree, an
area of limited statehood. According to Thomas Risse, as
much as 80 percent of the world’s population is affected, in
one way or another, by an area of limited statehood.8
Thinking in terms of areas of limited statehood also
disentangles governance from government (or the state).
This is especially important to the discussion of remote
sensing satellites and their role in mitigating some of
the harsher effects of limited statehood. While states are
limited in the ways previously described, it does not,
perforce, follow that governance is altogether missing.
Governance might instead come from alternative sources.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international
NGOs (INGOs), civil society organizations, clans, and
even gangs may serve, in varying places, moments, and to
varying degrees of effectiveness, as alternative governance
modalities. Most often, governance is provided by a mix
of modalities, such as public/private partnerships for public
service provisioning in mostly consolidated states, or INGO,
NGO, and international lending agency collaboration in
healthcare in areas with little or no state capacity.9
Multimodal governance is particularly important when
considering the role of technology as a sort of governance
force multiplier. Leveraging technology lowers the
organizational burden historically associated with the
provisioning of public goods.10 By lowering communication
and collaboration costs, information and communication
technology facilitates organizing without formal
8
9

Thomas Risse 2011, p. 6.
Marianne Beisheim, Transnational Partnerships: Effectively Providing for
Sustainable Development?, Collaborative Research Center (SFB-700)Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/
publikationen/palgrave/Beisheim_Liese_Transnational-Partnerships_2014/
index.html; Thomas Risse, Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited
Statehood: Actors, Modes, Institutions, and Resources, Working Paper 32,
Collaborative Research Center (SFB-700)- Governance in Areas of Limited
Statehood.
http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen/working_
papers/wp32/index.html. See also Andrew Chadwick, The Hybrid System,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 9–14.
10 Arthur Lupia and Gisela Sin, “Which Public Goods are Endangered?:
How Evolving Communication Technologies Affect The Logic of
Collective Action,” Public Choice, 2003, 117, pp. 315-331; Bruce Bimber,
Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of
Political Power, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jennifer
Earl and Katrina Kimport, Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in
the Internet Era, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); W. Lance Bennett
and Alexandra Segerberg, The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and
the Personalization of Contentious Politics, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2013).
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organizations, such as states. Hierarchically organized
bureaucratic structures are, in essence, communication
devices, facilitating flows of information and decisions
up and down a command and control organizational
structure. The state is the ultimate expression of this
particular governance morphology. Recent scholarship has
considered the role of digital technology in the provisioning
of public goods, even in the absence of formal hierarchical
state institutions. Community groups, NGOs, INGOs,
and states facing shortages in administrative resources can
leverage mobile telephony, digital maps, and text-messaging
aggregating systems such as FrontlineSMS to strive for goals
that would otherwise be unattainable.11 The main benefit
derived from the proliferation of these technologies is the
reduced communication and collaboration costs associated
with networked information environments. Rather than
building organizations to achieve a public good, digital
technologies are used to organize collective actions
intended to provide a public good, even in the absence of
the state. It involves a shift from a noun (organizations) to
a verb (organizing).
This study focuses on a second possible effect on governance
associated with the proliferation of digital technology.
Whereas digitally enabled collective action centers on
the use of digital technology in the provisioning of public
goods in areas of limited statehood, this paper concerns itself
with the use of digital technology in attempts to strengthen
accountability for the maladroit and indiscreet transgressions
of broadly recognized international norms. Stated more
precisely, this paper seeks to understand how remote
sensing might strengthen efforts to hold those responsible
for egregious acts of violence against civilian populations to
greater account.
Several examples of technologically enabled surveillance
of abuses illustrate this point. Mobile phone cameras are
now nearly ubiquitous. Among other outcomes, their
proliferation has led to a greater awareness of police
misconduct.12 In 2014, when the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) asked citizens to tweet pictures
of positive encounters with the NYPD it was instead
inundated by pictures of police violence directed against
11 Sharath Srinivasan, “FrontlineSMS, Mobile-for-Development and the ‘long
tail’ of governance,” in Steven Livingston and Gregor Walter-Drop (eds.), Bits
and Atoms: Information and Communication Technology in Areas of Limited
Statehood, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
12 Regina G. Lawrence, The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police
Brutality, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).
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citizens.13 In 2014, following several deadly confrontations
with citizens across the United States, there were broad
calls for police departments to adopt the use of cameras
as standard equipment for every police officer.14 In these
cases, relatively responsive state institutions took steps to
correct maladroit policing practices.
Crowdsourced election monitoring also relies on ubiquitous
mobile phones and digital maps.15 Intuitively, greater public
confidence in the integrity of an election diminishes the
likelihood of the sort of post-election violence seen in
Kenya in December 2007 and January 2008. Crowdsourced
mapping–or crisis mapping–is now used around the
world.16
Another example of digitally enabled transparency is
found in DNA matching. Like so many aspects of modern
life, advances in genetics have come hard on the heels of
advances in computer processing power and speed.17
Forensic anthropologists have taken advantage of the lower
costs and increased speed of genetic analysis to match the
DNA of victims of massacres with surviving members of an
affected community.18 From these data criminal cases are
built against the perpetrators of the violence.19
We are interested here in exploring the connection
between digital technologies and abuses by security forces
in places where the state is less responsive, either because
13 David Goodman, “Lesson for the Police: Be Careful What You Tweet For:
New York Police Reach Out on Twitter but Receive a Slap in the Face,” The
New York Times, April 22, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/
nyregion/new-york-police-reach-out-on-twitter-but-receive-a-slap-in-theface.html.
14 Tony Farrar and Barak Ariel, “Self-Awareness to Being Watched and SociallyDesirable Behavior: A Field Experiment on the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras
on Police Use-of-Force,” Police Foundation. http://www.policefoundation.
org/content/body-worn-camera.
15 Patrick Meier, Digital Humanitarians: How Big Data is Changing the Face of
Humanitarian Response, (New York: Taylor and Francis Press, forthcoming);
Catie Bailard and Steven Livingston, “Crowdsourcing Accountability
in a Nigerian Election, Journal of Information Technology and Politics,”
forthcoming.
16 Catie Bailard, Rob Baker, Matt Hindman, Steven Livingston and Patrick
Meier, Mapping the Maps: A Meta-Level Analysis of Crowdsourced Data,
A Report of the Internews Center for Innovation & Learning May 2012,
Washington DC. http://crowdglobe.net/report
17 Ed Uberbacher, “Computing the Gnome,” Oak Ridge National Laboratories.”
rhttp://web.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/v30n3-4/genome.htm.
18 Sarah Wagner, To Know Where He Lies: DNA Technology and the Search for
Srebrenica’s Missing, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008);
From Guatemalan Soil, Scientists Unearth Signs of Genocide,” PBS Newshour,
May 8 2013. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/science-jan-june13guatemala_05-08/.
19 Pamela Yates, “Granito: How to Nail a Dictator,”

of administrative incapacity, indifference, or deliberate
practice. Inquiries are limited to remote sensing satellite
images and geospatial data and their use by transnational
advocacy networks. This narrowed focus excludes other
research questions relating to digital technologies and
governance, along with some questions relating to remote
sensing alone and governance. A complete list of these
projects would itself constitute a separate paper.
The balance of this study will consider the role of remote
sensing and GIS in governance where the state is only
partially consolidated. Particular focus is given to cases in
which the state has the administrative or logistical capacity
to deploy force to most or all regions found within its
sovereign borders, while lacking the capacity to impose
discipline to prevent maladroit application of force against
civilian populations, often in violation of broadly recognized
international norms.20 An alternative circumstance is found
when the capacity to impose discipline exists in the absence
of will. Indeed, indiscriminate violence is the goal, either for
purposes of revenge or intimidation or other unfathomable
reasons. Applied in such cases, the use of force erodes the
legitimacy of the state. Max Weber’s definition of statehood
is important to this framing of the question. His definition
of statehood involves the legitimate application of violence
for the purpose of enforcing binding rules.
(W)e have to say that a state is a human community
that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory…Specifically, at the present time, the right
to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions
or to individuals only to the extent to which the state
permits it. The state is considered the sole source of
the ‘right’ to use violence.21
Poorly applied, the state’s use of force undermines
legitimacy. One of the examples offered below involves the
use of remote sensing satellite imagery to uncover abuses
by poorly trained and undisciplined Nigerian soldiers as
20 For example, see Will Ross, Uganda army in ‘rights abuses’,” BBC, July 16,
2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3071421.stm; Aufu Hirsch, “Mali’s
Army Suspected of Abuses and Unlawful Killings as War Rages,” The
Guardian, January 19, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
jan/19/mali-army-suspected-abuses-killings; Daniel R. DePetris, “Nigerian
Army Abuse Is Making It Difficult to #BringBackOurGirls,” The Huffington
Post, May 16, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-r-depetris/isamerican-law-obstructi-nigeria_b_5324612.html
21 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” p.1. http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf.
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they confronted Boko Haram, the Islamist insurgency
group.22 There is no question that Boko Haram is a security
threat to the people of Nigeria. Yet the Nigerian security
forces are themselves a separate threat to individual and
collective security. How might remote sensing help address
this condition? The next section begins an answer to this
question by way of a description of the evolution of remote
sensing technology.
22 “Nigeria: Massive Destruction, Death from Military Raid,” Human Rights
Watch, May 1, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massivedestruction-deaths-military-raid; Eric Schmitt and Brian Knowlton, “U.S.
Officials Question Ability of Nigeria to Rescue Girls,” The New York Times,
May 15, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/16/world/africa/nigerianmilitary-schoolgirl-hunt.html?_r=0; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on African Affairs “#BringBackOurGirls: Addressing the
Growing Threat of Boko Haram””Testimony of Alice Friend Principal
Director for African Affairs. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Friend_Testimony.pdf.
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Remote Sensing Satellites
Reconnaissance satellites have been in use for over a
half-century, starting with the launch of the American
Corona reconnaissance satellite in 1959 and the Soviet
Zenit satellite in July 1962.23 Several versions of the Zenit
satellite continued to be launched as late as 1994.24 Other
more recent Soviet/Russian satellites include the Resurs
and Persona series, with the latter also known as Kvarts
(Quartz).25 The next generation American satellite system
was the KH-11 KENNAN, renamed CRYSTAL in 1982 and
more recently dubbed the Evolved Enhanced CRYSTAL
(EEC).26 The later versions of the satellite are also classified
as KH-12, Advanced KENNAN, or Improved Crystal. The
original KENNAN was the first to employ Electro-optical
sensors and a charge-coupled device, allowing the film
capture system–involving the retrieval of a film canister–to
be replaced by data transmissions to earth.
Aside from the American and Russian government
programs, starting in the 1980s the Chinese government
developed film-return satellites, and in the 21st century
launched several Yaogan Weixing reconnaissance satellites.27
In Europe the Helios 2A (launched in 2004) and Helios 2B
(launched in 2009) are military observation satellites used
by France, Belgium, Spain, and Greece.28 These are among
the principal state reconnaissance satellite systems.
Little is known about the hardware and capabilities of state
operated satellites, though many have speculated that an
American KH-11 is roughly the size of the Hubble Space
Telescope (which is about the size of a city bus) and equipped
23 Day, D.A., Logsdon, J.M., Latell, B., Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy
Satellites, Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998). National
Reconnaissance Office Corona Fact Sheet. http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/
corona/factsheet.html; V. Agapov, “Launches of Zenit – 2 Spacecraft,” Novosti
Kosmonavtiki, Aerospace magazine of Videokosmos Company, Vol. 6, May
6 – 19, 1996, pp 68 – 69.
24 Robert Christy, Zarya: Soviet, Russian and International Space Flights;
Index of Vostok and Zenit Missions. http://www.zarya.info/Diaries/Zenit/
Zenitindex.php.
25 Anatoly Zak, Russianspaceweb.com. http://www.russianspaceweb.com/
persona.html
26 Bill Yenne, The Encyclopedia of US Spacecraft, (New York: Exeter Books,1985),
p.82.
27 Rui C. Barbosa, China Launch YaoGan Weixing-9, NASA Spaceflight.com,
March 5, 2010. http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/03/china-yaoganweixing-9-increase-in-vehicle-production/
28 Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), Helios, http://www.cnes.fr/web/
CNES-en/2744-helios.php.

with a similar 2.4-meter reflective mirror producing a sixinch spatial resolution. This means the satellite is capable of
distinguishing objects on the ground that are no larger than
six inches in diameter, or so it is speculated.
Some features of these powerful surveillance satellites
are hard to keep secret. The low-earth orbit and size of
the government satellites make them fairly easy to spot, a
fact that has created a hobby: satellite tracking. Amateur
satellite trackers around the world use telescopes and the
Internet to collaboratively track the orbital path of various
satellites. On August 28, 2013, a Delta-IV rocket, the most
powerful in the U.S. inventory, capable of putting a twentyfive ton payload into low Earth orbit, was used to launch a
National Reconnaissance Office satellite from Vandenberg
Air Force Base in California.29 Amateur satellite trackers
spotted the satellite on its very first orbit. They were able
to calculate its orbital parameters from information gleaned
from observing the satellite as it arced across the sky.30
From there, calculating an orbit of 252 by 996-Kilometer
at an inclination of 97.88 degrees, hobbyists were able to
deduce that it was, as originally suspected, a KH-11, and
that its mission was to complete a specific constellation of
surveillance satellites.31 Knowing the orbit of other KH-11s
led to the determination of the purpose of NROL-65 within
its first orbit.32 As evidenced, much can be deduced about
a satellite by its launch, orbit, and relationship to other
satellites in orbit.
Yet other aspects of government satellites are not well
known. This includes the nature and capabilities of the
sensors or cameras carried onboard. That is not true,
of course, for the commercial remote sensing industry.
Before describing several civilian and quasi-civilian satellite
systems it is appropriate to discuss some of the features
and capabilities of the hardware onboard commercial
satellites. The principal objective of this section is to
29 The launch can be viewed on YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gL1dEBZ6Vyc
30 Visual Satellite Observer’s Home Page. http://www.satobs.org/satintro.html
31 NROL-65 spotted in Classified Orbit by Satellite Trackers around the World,
August29, 2013. Spaceflight101. http://www.spaceflight101.com/delta-ivheavy-nrol-65-launch-updates.html
32 Real Time Satellite Tracking and Predictions. http://www.n2yo.com/
satellite/?s=39232
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illustrate capabilities without delving into an overburdened
discussion of the inventory of satellites and sensors.
Three important metrics are associated with remote
sensing satellites: spatial resolution, spectral resolution, and
temporal resolution.33 Spatial resolution refers to the detail
that is discernible in an image or, put another way, the size
of the smallest possible feature that can be detected in an
image. Figure 3 offers three contrasting images of the same
location. Moving from left to right, one sees an example of a
ten-meter resolution image, a thirty-meter resolution, and,
finally, an eighty-meter resolution image. The ten-meter
resolution image obviously offers the greatest detail of the
three images, yet it should be kept in mind that ten meter
resolution imaging is not representative of the most capable
high-resolution sensors. As we will see in our review of
several civilian or quasi-civilian satellite systems, most now
offer sub-one-meter resolution images, with one offering
thirty-one-centimeter (about 12 inches) images. That
means that from about 400 miles in space, high-resolution
sensors can take pictures that are detailed enough to see
objects on the ground that are about the size of a small
microwave oven. As a point of comparison, we noted above
that a KH-11 satellite might have a spatial resolution as
great as 6 inches.

A second metric is the spectral resolution of a sensor.
This refers to the number of bands of the electromagnetic
spectrum that a sensor is capable of detecting.
Electromagnetic radiation can be described as a stream of
photons moving at the speed of light in a wave-like pattern.
Visible light falls between infrared and ultra violet and
constitutes only a tiny fraction of energy. Radio waves,
microwaves, infrared waves, ultraviolet waves X-rays
and gamma rays make up the rest of the electromagnetic
spectrum. Spectral resolution is measured in terms of
bands, though it is important to keep in mind that there are
no truly fixed points of separation between bands. High or
hyper-spectral resolution involves 220 bands; medium or
multi-spectral resolution collects data in 3 - 15 bands; and
low spectral resolution collects data in 3 bands. A single
band image is generally displayed as shades of gray.
Spectroscopy or spectrography refers to the measurement of
radiation intensity as a function of wavelength in relation to
matter. Put metaphorically, it can see differences in matter.
Multispectral and hyper-spectral sensors and processing
systems are used in astronomy, agriculture, biomedical
imaging, mineralogy, physics, and surveillance. Physical
matter and gases leave unique ‘fingerprints’ according to

Figure 3
Source: Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing & Processing
http://www.crisp.nus.edu.sg/~research/tutorial/image.htm

33 These are the three key metrics for assessing satellite capabilities used in this
study. Others metrics not discussed here would include onboard data storage
capacity, geolocation accuracy, daily coverage total, swath width, and camera
agility, including the ability to take stereo images on the same pass. Stereo
images (two or more images taken of the same spot but from different angles)
offer the possibility of creating 3-dimensional extractions or models of the
imaged location. These attributes are discussed at length on various online
reviews.
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the energy they emit in relation to the electromagnetic
spectrum. Known as spectral signatures, they allow
scientists to identify the materials found in a scanned object.
For example, fat, water, and protein contents in industrial
scale meat batches are determined by near infrared (NIR)
reflectance spectroscopy.34 Another example is that of
spectral signatures, which help mineralogists find untapped
oil deposits and enologists map grape varieties growing in
a particular region.35 The health of a forest (determined by
measuring photosynthesis), the chemical composition of
smokestack plumes, or the material composition of waste
products either in the water or on the ground is detectable
from space. In short, “seeing” involves much more data
than is typically associated in popular imagination with
satellite images.

the more likely the image will be panchromatic (gray-scale).
This pattern in the satellite systems is summarized in Tables
1 and 2.

There are trade-offs between spatial resolution and spectral
resolution. High spatial resolution is associated with a low
spectral resolution. The more detailed the spatial resolution,

Yet images of whatever type and scale are not the most
important product of remote sensing satellites. The
ability to scientifically measure physical space adds to the

The final metric of interest to this paper is temporal
resolution, which refers to the frequency of flyovers of the
same location by a satellite or constellation of satellites.
This is also commonly referred to as revisit frequency.
Intelligence agencies -- and now NGOs and advocacy
organizations -- use repeated coverage of the same location
to reveal changes in infrastructure or naturally occurring
features.36 Deforestation, receding glaciers, rising oceans,
weapons facilities, troop deployments, construction sites,
and soil disruption (where mass graves might be situated)
are monitored over time from orbit.

Figure 4
Source: http://www.cyberphysics.co.uk/topics/light/emspect.htm
34 Liu, Y., Lyon, B.G., Windham, W.R., Realini, C.E., Dean, T., Pringle, D.,
Duckett, S., “Prediction of Color, Texture, and Sensory Characteristics of Beef
Steaks by Visible and Near Infrared Reflectance Spectroscopy, Meat Science
65 (2003) 1107–1115.
35 Freddie M. Lacar, Megan Mary Lewis, and Iain Thomas Grierson, “Use of
Hyperspectral Imagery for Mapping Grape Varieties in the Barossa Valley,
South Australia,” Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium (IGARSS’01)
- IEEE 2001 International, vol.6 pp. 2875-2877.

36 Sean Aday and Steven Livingston, “NGOs as Intelligence Agencies: The
Empowerment of Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Media by
Commercial Remote Sensing in the Case of Iranian the Nuclear Program,”
Geoforum, 40 (2009) 514-522.
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importance of remote sensing. The geodetic location of a
topographical feature on, in, or above the Earth is calculated
according to its longitude, latitude, and its vertical distance
from the center of the Earth.37 Determination of geodetic
location is now assisted by the specification of every inch
of the planet’s surface and the creation of technologies that
allow for geospatial awareness, that is, the constant update
of awareness of where in space anything is temporally
situated.
Geographical information systems (GIS) are software
platforms used to manage and process geospatial data.
With GIS and a handheld instrument able to interact with
37 Lynn Carlson, “Understanding Geospatial Data Files used in Geographic
Information System Software,” GIS Manager Environmental and Remote
Technologies Lab Brown University. http://gisatbrown.typepad.com/gis/files/
spatialdatafiles.pdf

geographical positioning satellites (GPS), or other devices
such as mobile phones that achieve a similar effect through
triangulation with cell towers (that are themselves situated
in precisely known coordinates), one can situate any object
or phenomena in physical space on a digital map. These
are the technical attributes that make “smart bombs” smart,
capable of striking targets thousands of miles away by
following GPS signals in relation to a set of coordinates.
The same attributes allow commuters to find a particular
destination. Another important feature of GIS and remote
sensing geospatial data is the ability to array data about
events and phenomena in physical space. By putting a pin
on a digital map, usually referred to as dropping a waypoint,
one can specify the location of an event or abstract
phenomena. Patterns and associations are revealed in the
process.

The Emergence of a Commercial Remote Sensing Sector
How has the commercial remote sensing industry emerged?
Part of the story involves the evolution of Landsat. Landsat
was one of the first remote sensing satellite systems to
transition from a state ownership and operation system
to the private sector. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter
authorized the transfer of Landsat operations from NASA
to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association
(NOAA). Carter’s order also signaled the eventual
privatization of Landsat. This occurred six years later, when
the Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT), a jointly
owned company by RCA and Hughes Aircraft, assumed
control of the operation. At time of this writing, there have
been eight Landsat satellites in all (one of which failed), and
two operational Landsat satellites in orbit in 2014.

characteristic of offering images and other data for sale
on an open market. In the case of American commercial
satellites, this capability is the result of the Land Remote
Sensing Policy Act of 1992. The Act declared the United
States’ support of “continuous collection and utilization of
land remote sensing data from space” in the belief that such
data are of “major benefit in studying and understanding
human impacts on the global environment, in managing the
Earth’s natural resources, in carrying out national Security
functions, and in planning and conducting many other
activities of scientific, economic, and social importance.”
To this end, it established procedures for licensing private
remote sensing companies.

Strict references to commercial or private satellites, as
opposed to state-owned satellites, are difficult. “Private”
and “commercial” have different definitions in different
nation-states. In Europe, references to commercial
satellites connote the ability to generate revenue, regardless
of ownership of the satellite. In the U.S., the term
“commercial” is applied to private sector satellites. Despite
the differences, “commercial” satellites share the common

In 1994, Lockheed was granted one of the first licenses from
the U.S. Department of Commerce for commercial satellite
high-resolution imagery. In October 1995, Space Imaging,
a partnering company with Lockheed, launched the Ikonos
satellite in September 1999. On January 1, 2000, Ikonos’
1-meter panchromatic and 4-meter multispectral imagery
went on the market. It was the world’s first commercial,
high-resolution remote sensing satellite. Hundreds more
satellites have followed.
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Table 1
Source: Landsat—A Global Land-Imaging Mission, United States Geological Survey

Satellite

Launch

Decommissioned

Sensors

Landsat 1

July 23, 1972

January 6, 1978

MSS/RBV

Landsat 2

January 22, 1975

July 27, 1983

MSS/RBV

Landsat 3

March 5, 1978

September 7, 1983

MSS/RBV

Landsat 4

July 16, 1982

June 15, 2001

MSS/TM

Landsat 5

March 1, 1984

2013

MSS/TM

Landsat 6

October 5, 1993

Failed

ETM

Landsat 7

April 15, 1999

Operational

ETM+

Landsat 8

February 11, 2013

Operational

OLI/TIRS

Table 2 Several examples of Satellites Offering Data on the International Market
Source: Assembled by Author

Temporal R
 esolution

Country of Origin

RADARSAT-1

Name

November 4, 1995

Launch Date

Variablea

Spatial Resolution

24 days

Canada

IRS-1C

December 28, 1995

6 meter panchromatic

24 days

India

EarlyBird-1

December 24, 1997

3 meter panchromatic
15 meter multispectral

N/A

USA

Ikonos

September 24, 1999

82 cm panchromatic
3.2 meter multispectral

3 days

USA

EROS-A

December 5, 2000

1.8 meter

N/A

Israel

QuickBird

October 18, 2001

60 cm panchromatic
2.4 meter multispectral

1 – 3.5 days

USA

Spot 5

May 4, 2002

5 meter panchromatic
10 meter multispectral

2 – 3 days

France

OrbView-3

June 2003

1 meter panchromatic
4 meter multispectral

< 3 days

USA

Carosat-1

May 5, 2005

2.5 meter panchromatic

5 days

India

EROS-B

April 25, 2006

70 cm

N/A

Israel

Cartosat-2

January 10, 2007

< 1 meter

4 days

India

Cosmo SkyMed-1

June 8, 2007

SARb

Few hours in constellation

Italy

TerraSar-X

June 15, 2007

Variable, to 1 meter
SAR

2.5 days

Germany

WorldView-1

September 18, 2007

.5 meter panchromatic

1.7 days

USA

Cosmo SkyMed-2

December 9, 2007

SAR

Few hours in constellation

Italy

RADARSAT-2

December 14, 2007

Variable to 1 meter SARc

N/A

Canada

Cartosat-2A

April 28, 2008

< 1 meter panchromatic

4 days

India

GeoEye-1

September 6, 2008

0.41 meter panchromatic
1.65 meter multispectrald

< 3 days

USA

Cosmo SkyMed-3

October 25, 2008

SAR

Few hours in constellation

Italy
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WorldView-2

October 8, 2009

46 cm panchromatic
1.84 meters Multispectral:

TanDEM-X

June 21, 2010

Variablee

1.1 days

USA
Germany

Cartosat-2B

July 12, 2010

< 1 meter panchromatic

4 days

India

Cosmo SkyMed-4

November 6, 2010

SAR

Few hours in constellation

Italy

NigeriaSat-2

August 17, 2011

2.5 meter panchromatic
5 meter multispectral

N/A

Nigeria

WorldView-3

Scheduled to launch
on August 13, 2014

31 cm panchromatic
1.24 meter multispectral
3.7 meter short wave infrared
30 meter CAVISf

< 1 day

USA

Spot 6

September 9, 2012

Panchromatic - 1.5 meter
Multispectral – 6 meters
(B,G,R,NIR)

1 day

France

Spot 7

June 30, 2014

Panchromatic 1.5m
Multispectral - 6.0m
(B,G,R,NIR)

1 day

France

Pleiades-1A

December 16, 2011

Panchromatic
.5 meter
2-meter multispectral

< dayg

France

Pleiades-1B

December 2, 2012

Panchromatic .5 meter
2-meter multispectral

< day

France

Radarsat-1 had synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Rather than “passively” collect reflected solar energy from the earth’s surface as an optical sensor satellite does, SAR transmits microwave energy to the surface and then collects its reflected energy. This allows radar-based satellite sensors to collect data day or night and with any atmospheric
condition. Radarsat-1’s resolution was variable, with seven beam modes, each offering a different image resolution. The modes include: Fine with a resolution of 10 meters;
Standard with a resolution of 30 meters; and ScanSAR with a resolution of 100 meters. This is a standard feature of radar-based sensors.
b
COSMO-SkyMed is a constellation of four satellites (COSMO 1 – 4) with high-resolution SAR. It is possible to integrate the system with the optical satellites of the French
Pléiades high-resolution optical constellation.
c
http://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/pdf/radarsat2_201004_e.pdf
d
A change in orbit in 2013 changed it from 41 to 46 cm panchromatic.
e
“The first of the two, TerraSAR-X, has been operating since 2007. Three years on, it has been joined by its twin satellite, TanDEM-X. Flying in close formation only a few
hundred meters apart, the two satellites are imaging the terrain below them simultaneously, from different angles. These images are processed into accurate elevation maps
with a 12-metre resolution and a vertical accuracy better than 2 meters.” http://www.dlr.de/eo/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-5727/10086_read-21046/.
f
Clouds, Aerosols, Vapors, Ice, and Snow
g
The Pléiades satellites are the high-resolution optical imaging component of the French-Italian Orfeo system. The Pléiades and Cosmo SkyMed systems work cooperatively.
a

Regarding the three key metrics used in this study, one
can see a steady advance in the technical capabilities of
commercial satellites
By 2014, it had become apparent that the U.S. remote
sensing industry could not compete with emerging foreign
competition without a change in the resolution limits
established by the Department of Commerce. In June
2014, a fifty-centimeter spatial resolution limitation was
lifted. From early 2015, the limit would be reduced to 30
centimeters. That change applied immediately to GeoEye-1
and WorldView-2, which have the technical capacity to
take panchromatic images at resolutions of 41 and 46
centimeters, respectively. Both of these satellites are owned
and operated by DigitalGlobe, an American company.
Page 16

In August 2014, DigitalGlobe launched its WorldView-3
satellite, which has a thirty-one-centimeter resolution in
the panchromatic range and is capable of collecting up to
680,000 square km per day.38
Spatial resolution alone may not matter as much as other
technical characteristics. What is analytically possible with
thirty-centimeter resolution imagery may not outweigh
what one can be accomplished with a one-meter spatial
resolution satellite with a high temporal resolution. In
other words, “good enough” one-meter spatial resolution
38 “U.S. Department of Commerce Relaxes Resolution Restrictions DigitalGlobe
Extends Lead in Image Quality,” June 11, 2014. http://www.marketwired.com/
press-release/us-department-commerce-relaxes-resolution-restrictionsdigitalglobe-extends-lead-image-nyse-dgi-1919482.htm
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Figure 5
Source: Nano/Microsatellite Market Assessment 2014, Spaceworks

images that are updated rapidly can be more important to
understanding a situation, especially in quickly evolving
crises. Pleiades-1A and 1B and Cosmo SkyMed satellites
operate as a constellation of compatible sensors. Yet
constellations of satellites are expensive. Reaching back
to Keyhole and other government satellites, conventional
imaging satellites are designed for government needs, with
each one costing about $800 million and their sizes and
weights (about two tons) making them expensive to launch.
A different model began to emerge in 2014. Companies
using off-the-shelf components and open-source software
began to build satellites weighing only about 200 pounds. Socalled CubeSats, measuring about 30 x 10 x 10 centimeters
or less, were the inspiration of this new generation of remote
sensing satellites. Their simplified manufacturing process
and reduced weight means they are less expensive to build
and put into orbit. Ninety-two CubeSats were launched
in all of 2013.39 By the first half of 2014, 122 satellites with
masses between one and fifty kilograms (2.5 - 110 pounds)
had been launched. By comparison, 92 CubeSats were
launches in all of 2013. Most of the growth in CubeSats is
found in the remote sensing sector.

sensing CubeSats, whereas only twelve percent were used
for remote sensing between 2009 and 2013.40

Analysts forecasts anticipate that fifty-two percent of
launches between 2014 and 2016 will be devoted to remote

40 “SkySat-1 Captures First High-Resolution, HD Video of Earth from Space,”
Skybox, December 27, 2013. Nano/Microsatellite Market Assessment 2014,
Spaceworks. http://www.sei.aero/eng/papers/uploads/archive/SpaceWorks_
Nano_Microsatellite_Market_Assessment_January_2014.pdf
41 Richard Taylor, “Mini-satellites Send High-definition Views of Earth,” “Minisatellites send high-definition views of Earth”, BBC, 15 May 2014. Retrieved
on 16 May 2014.

39 Jeff Foust, “The Commercial Remote Sensing Boom,” The Space Review, June
16, 2014. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2534/1.

There are at least four firms pursuing the development of
large constellations of remote sensing CubeSats. Skybox,
now owned by Google, is probably in the strongest position
to succeed. In November 2013, Skybox launched SkySat-1.
One month later, it revealed its first images, followed quickly
by an unveiling of the first video taken by a commercial
satellite. The videos allow for clear tracking of automobiles
and other vehicles—even airplanes flying across the sky far
below the satellite. Eventually, the company hopes to have a
constellation of twenty-four satellites in orbit.
Planet Labs, another CubeSat company, is pursuing the
deployment of over one hundred medium-resolution
remote sensing satellites. Its first “flock” of twentyeight satellites was delivered to and then deployed by the
International Space Station in January 2014. Planet Labs
plans to launch a total of 131 satellites by mid-2015.41 With
that many almost identical satellites in orbit, one filling in
for another in a synchronized orbital rotation, temporal
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resolution will be measured in hours at most.42 And of
course the Pléiades and Cosmo SkyMed systems already
work cooperatively to produce high-resolution radar and
optical data with temporal resolution measured by hours.
Another example of constellations lowering the temporal
resolution of remote sensing is the Disaster Monitoring
Constellation (DMC). DMC consists of satellites
constructed by Surrey Satellite Technologies, a British firm.
DMC International Imaging, the company that manages
the DMC, operates the satellites for the Algerian, Nigerian,
Turkish, British and Chinese governments. DMC’s purpose
is to provide emergency Earth imaging for disaster relief
42 Jeff Foust, “The Commercial Remote Sensing Boom,” The Space Review, June
16, 2014. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2534/1.
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under the International Charter for Space and Major
Disasters. The International Charter on Space and Major
Disasters provides for the charitable acquisition of and
transmission of remote sensing data to relief organizations
in the event of major disasters.43
These are some of the major developments in commercial
remote sensing since mostly 2000. The chief attribute of the
commercial satellites may not be spatial resolution. It really
depends on the purpose of the image. “Good enough”
one-meter resolution that can be updated in hours may
be the more important attribute. And of course geospatial
data are important, too. How might satellite data affect the
regulation of violence in areas of limited statehood?
43 www.disasterscharter.org
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Remote Sensing and the Regulation of Violence
The principal objective of this paper is to consider the
possible role of remote sensing satellites and geospatial
data in areas of limited statehood. Governance refers to
“the various institutionalized modes of social coordination
to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or
to provide collective goods.”44 Gregor Walter-Drop and
I have focused on the affordances or efficiencies created
by information and communication technology (ICT)
in the provisioning of collective goods, either by states
or by alternative governance modalities, such as NGOs
and community-based organizations. Similarly, Krasner
and Risse have recently highlighted the provisioning of
collective goods by external actors.45 Less attention has
been given to the possible roles of ICT in the enforcement of
binding rules. There is, of course, a great deal of academic
and popular attention paid to the use of ICT by states for
surveillance of domestic and foreign populations. While
that is an important issue, my focus here is on the use of
ICT by nonstate actors in their effort to monitor violence
by states.
Put differently, I am interested in the use of remote sensing
satellites for what might be called the “regulation of
violence.” How might ICT regulate the use of force by those
who assert a responsibility and right to enforce binding
rules, but who tend to do so poorly or with excessive and
indiscriminant violence? The reference to “regulation” is
metaphorical; it is intended as a short-hand reference to
efforts by nonstate actors to, first, identify transgressions
of broadly recognized international norms and, second,
to put pressure on those who are responsible for the
transgression. The objective is to stop the transgressions,
in part by shedding light on them and by holding
those responsible for past transgressions accountable.
Max Weber’s classic definition of statehood highlights the
role of force or violence in state-based governance. “The
44 Risse, 2011, p. 9, emphasis added.
45 Stephen D. Krasner and Thomas Risse, External Actors, State-Building,
and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood,” Governance: An
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. No. 2014.

modern state is a compulsory association that organizes
domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize
the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination
within a territory.”46 In an area of limited statehood, this
ability is somehow impaired. A weak or limited state is
unsuccessful in its efforts to provide collective goods and
its enforcement of binding rules with the use of force. At
times, the state’s legitimacy—to the degree it has it—is
undermined by the way force is employed. My interest
centers on the possible role of ICT in addressing the
maladroit use of force.
An enormous number of research questions emerge from a
consideration of the enforcement of binding rules by various
governance modalities or combination of modalities.
Intuitively, one would assume that different governance
modalities—NGOs, INGOs, firms, and clan systems—
enforce binding rules in different ways. Identifying the
full range of governance modalities and possible maladroit
enforcement of binding rules would itself constitute an
important research project. This paper cannot adequately
cover all permutations found in security provisioning and
enforcement of binding rules by an empirically legitimate
use of force across all variations of governance. Instead, it
will focus on the digital regulation of violence in a particular
governance space. It can be specified by the following terms:
1. It involves violence in sectorial, spatial, temporal, or
social areas of limited statehood.
2. State actors, such as police, military, or other state
security personnel, or their designated surrogates, such
as private security firms or allied militias, are the agents
of violence.
3. Local and global nonstate actors–transnational
advocacy organizations–attempt to regulate these state
actors in response to their maladroit use of force. In
most cases, the use of force in question constitutes a
violation of broadly recognized international norms.

46 Weber, p. 4.
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Figure 6
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project

In sum, I am interested in the use of remote sensing and
other ICTs by nonstate actors who hope to alter the behavior
of state actors who have or are using force in such a way as
to violate broadly recognized norms. A part of this process
is verification of such an abuse.
Where states are functioning or consolidated, the regulation
of violence is often performed by official oversight offices
or by civilian oversight commissions established by the
state. Technologically enabled nonstate actors’ regulation
of violence can be seen as a functional equivalent of these
state administrative entities. Where the state is too weak
to hold its own security forces to account and to monitor,
investigate, and verify the nature of their conduct, nonstate
actors fill at least some of the void. Nonstate actors offer a
functional equivalency to a consolidated state’s oversight
functions.
Page 20

Human rights monitoring groups such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch are counted among
the nonstate actors involved in the regulation of violence.
In a different manner, various forensic anthropology
organizations create a factual basis for verifying human
rights abuses by state agents. Examples would include the
Argentinian Forensic Anthropology Team, the Guatemalan
Forensic Anthropology Foundation, the Peruvian Forensic
Anthropology Team, and the International Commission
on Missing Persons, an intergovernmental organization
established by several states to investigate the Srebrenica
massacre and other human rights atrocities of the Bosnian
civil war.47
47 Argentinian Forensic Anthropology Team, http://www.eaaf.org; Guatemalan
Forensic Anthropology Foundation, http://www.fafg.org; Peruvian Forensic
Anthropology Team, http://cja.org/article.php?id=1153; International
Commission on Missing Persons, http://www.ic-mp.org.
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Figure 7
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project

DNA matching in the identification of human mortal
remains offers one example of nonstate actor regulation of
violence. In the Balkans, Guatemala, and Peru, among other
locations, nonstate, NGO-coalitions have used advances in
DNA analysis (an information technology in the sense that
the human genome is mapped only with the assistance of
powerful, high-speed computers). Once the remains have
been positively identified, the evidence becomes the basis
for various sorts of criminal prosecutions (which is in
itself an interesting aspect of the regulation of violence), as
discussed by Kathryn Sikkink.48
Another example of the use of ICTs for the regulation
of violence is found in groups that use data from highresolution remote sensing satellites that are owned and
48 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are
Changing World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011).

operated by commercial firms. Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, the Institute for Science and
International Security, and the Satellite Sentinel Project all
offer examples of NGOs using remote sensing geospatial
data in their advocacy work.49
Remote sensing and GIS are used to monitor compliance
with broadly shared international norms in East Africa.
DigitalGlobe, a remote sensing information company,
and Enough, a human rights advocacy organization, have
49 Remote Sensing for Human Rights, Amnesty International. http://www.
amnestyusa.org/research/science-for-human-rights/remote-sensing-forhuman-rights; North Kivu Satellite Imagery, Human Rights Watch, http://
www.hrw.org/node/86034; Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights
Project,” American Association for the Advancement of Science. http://
www.aaas.org/program/geospatial-technologies-and-human-rights-project;
Institute for Science and International Security, http://www.isis-online.org;
Satellite Sentinel Project, http://www.satsentinel.org/reports-and-imagery.
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Figure 8
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project

partnered to create the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP). It
uses DigitalGlobe’s satellite imagery to monitor conflict in
the South Sudan.

military installations or checkpoints in at least nine
locations along the border, while the Sudan Armed
Forces, SAF, have positions in at least five locations
along the border, some with visible tanks and heavy
artillery.50

In an effort to avoid confrontations, Sudan and South
Sudan agreed in September 2012 to create a 12.5-mile (20
kilometer) demilitarized zone along their shared border.
The agreement required both sides to remove military
forces and equipment from the buffer zone and establish a
verification mechanism. Although both countries agreed to
implement the agreement in March 2013, SSP determined
that both countries remained out of compliance as late as
June 2013. Using DigitalGlobe satellite imagery acquired in
May and June 2013, several violations were evident:

Images captured on February 13, 2012, May 6, 2013, and
June 3, 2013 (see Figure 6) show a Sudanese infantry
company, including howitzers, tanks, and several tents that
presumably cover more tanks, all in the demilitarized zone.
Figure 7 identifies elements of an SPLA (South Sudan)
infantry unit also found in the demilitarized zone. Figure
8 identifies something as small as a platoon-size force in
violation of the agreement.

Satellite imagery supports the conclusion that the
Sudan Peoples Liberation Army, or SPLA, maintain

50 Troops in the Demilitarized Zone: Confirmation of Violations by Sudan
and South Sudan, The Satellite Sentinel Project, (2013), p. 1. http://www.
enoughproject.org/files/Troops-in-the-Demilitarized-Zone.pdf
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Figure 9
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project

In another example, SSP has relied on DigitalGlobe imagery
to monitor and document harm done to civilians caught in
battles between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the rebel
Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).51 The burning of several
villages and repeated indiscriminate bombing of civilian
areas in Abu Kershola are clearly evident in the images.
Figure 9 notes the extensive presence of bomb craters
scattered about Abu Kershola.
Figure 10, another image taken on April 22, 2013, shows the
charred remains of the village of Ad Dandour.
Less dramatic examples of monitoring and evaluation
initiatives using commercial imagery can be offered as
well. For example, evaluation of present vegetation cover
51 Civilians Caught in the Crossfire: The Bombing of Abu Kershola and Burning of
Ad Dandour, Satellite Sentinel Project

and health in comparison with past imagery – factoring in
other environmental variables such as ocean temperatures
– is used to predict drought conditions in East Africa.52
Finally, remote sensing data and GIS rest in the background
of all “crisis mapping” initiatives. Examples include the first
deployment of the Ushahidi open-source GIS platform
used to monitor post-election violence during the 200708 Kenyan elections. Since its launch, anywhere in the
world where Ushahidi has been used to crowdsource geo52 Tsegaye Tadesses, Getachew Berhan Demisse, Ben Zaitchik, and Tufa
Dinku, “Satellite-based Hybrid Drought Monitoring Tool for Prediction
of Vegitation Condition in East Africa: A Case Study for Ethiopia,” Water
Resource Research, Vol 50, Issue 3, March 2014, pp. 2176-2190; Markus
Enenkel, Linda See, Rogerio Bonifacio, Vijendra Boken, Nathaniel Chaney,
Patrick Vinck, Liangzhi You, Emanuel Dutra, Martha Anderson, “Drought
and Food Security – Improving Decision-Support via New Technologies
and Innovative Collaboration,” Global Food Security, (2014), http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.gfs.2014.08.005.
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Figure 10
Source: Satellite Sentinel Project

referenced spots, the same geospatial awareness is relied
upon.
These are just a few examples of the use of remote sensing in
the regulation of violence in areas of limited statehood. How
might these developments be articulated in the theoretical
literature of political science? It has already been noted that
the limited statehood literature frames the consideration
of conditions leading to the use of indiscriminate,
undisciplined violence by the security forces responsible for
the provisioning of individual and collective security. To
account for the use of remote sensing by nonstate actors
requires another theoretical anchor.
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s “boomerang
model” of transnational advocacy offers a way to understand
this process. According to the boomerang model,
NGOs in a country experiencing violations of broadly
Page 24

recognized international norms make appeals to the NGOs,
foundations, and state institutions of another country in
an attempt to convince them put pressure on the state that
is in violation of norms. Together, transnational NGOs,
international organizations, and some state institutional
coalitions create what Keck and Sikkink call Transnational
Advocacy Networks (TANs). Verification processes of the
alleged violations are an important part of the process.53 At
the heart of TAN work is a dense exchange of information
and services. “What is novel in these networks is the
ability of nontraditional international actors to mobilize
information strategically to help create new issues and
categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over
much more powerful organizations and governments.”54
53 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics (Kindle Locations 134-139). Cornell
University Press. Kindle Edition. Emphasis added.
54 Keck and Sikkink, Kindle Locations 159-160.
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Lacking more traditional avenues of success in political
influence, such as money and force, they “must use the
power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the
information and value contexts within which states make
policies.”55
TANs use commercial remote sensing satellite data to “map”
the range of possible unregulated state violence. Mapping is
the process of making illegible terrain clear to an outsider.
Maps, as James Scott notes, are more than just maps. When
allied with state power, “maps enable much of the reality
they depicted to be remade.”56 State simplifications of
the kind examined in this paper are designed to provide
authorities with a schematic view of their society, a view
Scott assumes is not afforded to those outside the state.57
In this respect, Scott is wrong. States no longer enjoy a
monopoly on the synoptic view of earth from space. From
the vantage point of space, a précis of the entire earth is
offered the user of commercial remote sensing satellite data.
With private satellite technology, legibility as Scott describes
it has been decoupled from the state. Nonstate actors,
from corporations to nongovernmental organizations
and community groups now have access to the means of
ordering a disorderly world on their own terms.

55 Keck and Sikkink, Kindle Locations 390-391.
56 Scott, p. 3, Kindle
57 Scott, p. 79 Kindle
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